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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of the microgenetic method in science education. The 
microgenetic method is a technique for exploring the progression of learning in detail 
through repeated, high frequency observations of a learner’s ‘performance’ in some 
activity. Existing microgenetic studies in science education (including some studies of 
science learning published in journals not focused on science education) are analysed. 
This leads to an examination of five significant methodological issues in microgenetic 
research. Firstly, the fit of the microgenetic method with qualitative and/or 
quantitative approaches to data collection and analysis is considered and a case is 
made for the appropriateness of microgenetic research of a qualitative nature. 
Secondly, it is argued that researchers may define static intervals, periods within 
which (for methodological purposes) change is assumed not to occur, when reporting 
microgenetic studies. Thirdly, researchers should consider providing justifications for 
their choice of sampling rate with reference to the rate of change of the phenomenon 
they are studying. Fourthly, the difficulty of distinguishing conceptual change from 
the existence of multiple understandings is highlighted. Finally, the nature of 
sequences of repeated measures in microgenetic studies is considered. It is argued that 
different methodological approaches are suitable for microgenetic studies of different 
phenomena. The paper concludes with a list of guidelines for the use of the 
microgenetic method in small-scale, qualitatively analysed studies in science 
education. 
Introduction 
 
Though learning has been conceptualised in a variety of ways, models 
typically include a description of change over time (Lachman, 1997, p. 479; Marton, 
1983, p. 291; Mowrer & Klein, 2001, p. 2). Therefore, assessments of learning, in the 
context of science education and also in other disciplines, require data collection at 
multiple points in time in order to develop an understanding of change. In particular, 
learning in science education is often modelled as conceptual change (Duit & 
Treagust, 2003; Rusanen & Lappi, 2013, p. 3332), the process by which one concept 
or set of concepts is altered over time (Chi & Roscoe, 2002, p. 4; Posner, Strike, 
Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982, p. 211; Rusanen & Lappi, 2013, p. 3332). One common 
approach to investigating conceptual change is to employ longitudinal studies which 
are based on reports of students’ learning at a small number of points over time 
(White & Arzi, 2005). Longitudinal studies make use of repeated applications of 
assessments, for example, concept maps (Novak & Musonda, 1991), concept 
inventories (Caballero et al., 2012) or interviews (Taber, 2001). Longitudinal 
approaches, however, may fail to develop a complete representation of change 
because learning is a ‘messy’ process (Taber, 2013, p. 216), that is, change may occur 
over a number of timescales (Blown & Bryce, 2006; Clement, 2008; Gilbert & Watts, 
1983; Thornton, 1997), involve changes to multiple co-existing understandings 
(Harrison & Treagust, 2000; Mortimer, 1995; Taber, 2000b) and fail to reach a stable 
state even during extended periods of observation (Shuell, 1990, p. 531). In studies 
that seek to represent change, a researcher’s choice of the frequency with which data 
is sampled, relative to the rate of change of the phenomenon being studied, will 
influence how a data set is constructed. This paper examines a particular approach 
towards the collection of data related to change, the microgenetic method. 
 
In order to develop a faithful representation of change, the microgenetic 
method, which will be defined in detail below, involves the collection of data at a 
frequency which is considered to be high compared to the rate of change of the 
phenomenon being studied (Siegler & Crowley, 1991, p. 606). The method therefore 
offers a way of exploring learning that goes beyond the pre-test/post-test paradigm 
that simply asks whether there is an observable change that might be taken as 
evidence of learning between two assessments, and investigates the patterns of change 
over time as a learner engages in some activity. 
 
Consider the case of a researcher investigating conceptual change in a 
particular topic. They might probe a student’s understanding at two points in time, 
several months apart, and draw inferences about learning from differences between 
the assessments. Alternatively, a researcher adopting the microgenetic approach might 
seek to sample the student’s understanding at a frequency that is high compared to the 
rate at which they assume conceptual change occurs. For example, if they assumed 
conceptual change occurred over many months, they might argue that weekly 
assessment, over a period of several months, would represent a high density of 
sampling relative to changes in understanding. Though the longitudinal study can 
describe the start and endpoints of conceptual change, it cannot shed light on the 
patterns of change. The microgenetic study therefore, as well as providing 
information on what students know, can also describe ‘how they got there’ (Goldin-
Meadow & Wagner Alibali, 2002, p. 94). A more traditional longitudinal approach is 
also unable to distinguish genuine changes in understanding from the situation where 
a learner holds manifold conceptions and different responses are elicited some time 
apart from a wider repertoire of available and (to the learner) feasible responses.   
The detailed data developed by the approach, which has been described as ‘untidy’ 
(Flynn, Pine, & Lewis, 2007, p. 4), can be both a benefit and present a challenge to 
the researcher as it may contain moments of sudden change, multiple advances and 
regressions, or evidence of multiple co-existing positions. This paper sets out to 
examine the application of the microgenetic method to studies in science education 
and considers the manner in which the approach constructs data. 
 
The word microgenetic was coined by Werner (1956, p. 347) to describe the 
‘unfolding’ of a ‘human activity such as perceiving, thinking, acting etc.’ over 
timescales ranging from seconds to days. The term genetic here refers to the origin or 
genesis of ideas, rather than sections of chromosomes (Siegler, 2006, p. 471). This 
usage is familiar from the genetic epistemology programme of Jean Piaget (1970), 
that has been very influential in science education (Bliss, 1995).Werner’s work arose 
from ideas developed by the Ganzheitspsychologie group led by Friedrich Sander 
(Rosenthal, 2004, p. 221). Sander (1930, p. 192) argued that ‘[o]nly a further and 
further dissection, and a destructive analysis, can ever arrive at those disconnected 
pieces which the old psychology designated as elements.’ Sander’s notion was taken 
up by Vygotsky (1930/1978, p. 61) who maintained research should include a focus 
on processes that occur on short timescales and processes of change as ‘…it is only in 
movement that a body shows what it is.’ As it was adopted by researchers in 
developmental psychology, the usage of the term microgenetic has shifted, to refer to 
studies of the variation in the use of strategies or skills over time (Siegler & Crowley, 
1991, p. 606). For example, microgenetic studies have sought to investigate the 
development of: number conservation (Siegler, 1995), analogical reasoning (Cheshire 
et al. 2007) and motor skills (Adolph et al., 2008). Flynn, Pine and Lewis’ (2006) 
paper, provides a good introduction to the method in the context of developmental 
psychology. A number of studies published in the developmental psychology 
literature focus on the development of skills and strategies related to learning about 
science and may be of interest to researchers in science education (For example, 
Opfer & Siegler, 2004; Van Der Steen, Steenbeek, Van Dijk, & Van Geert, 2014). In 
addition to developing a set of recommendations for researchers describing change in 
science education, this paper also seeks to highlight a number of significant studies 
describing changes in students’ learning of science that have been published outside 
science education research journals. 
 
The microgenetic method may be relevant to research in science education for 
three reasons. Firstly, investigating conceptual change is a central research 
programme of science education (Treagust & Duit, 2009, p. 90) and the microgenetic 
method is well suited to observing change as it occurs (Kuhn, 1995, p. 133). 
Secondly, investigating cognitive structure (i.e. the hypothetical underlying structure 
of representations of the world that facilitates a person’s active conceptualisations) is 
challenging as learners may hold manifold conceptions of a topic (Harrison & 
Treagust, 2000; Mortimer, 1995; Taber, 2000b). Microgenetic investigations of a 
person’s conceptualisations, over extended time periods, may be able to differentiate 
between substantive conceptual change and the existence of multiple conceptions (see 
the discussion of the concept of the static interval, below). Finally, though high-
density sampling may produce data that appear highly variable and ‘untidy’ (Flynn et 
al., 2007, p. 4), such data may allow researchers to begin to distinguish ‘mental 
flotsam and jetsam’ (Taber, 1995, p. 5) from more stable constructions. 
Following a search of the literature (the search procedure is described in detail 
in the microgenetic method in science education section, below), we identified around 
thirty studies, which focus on contexts related to science education and whose authors 
claim to have used the microgenetic method. As will be discussed later in the article, 
these studies are mostly small-scale in terms of number of participants (N). An 
examination of these studies leads to five questions, which arise from an examination 
of learning using high-density sampling. These questions will act as the basis of the 
discussion in the body of this article. 
 
a) Can the microgenetic approach be used within research designs 
collecting and analysing either, or both, qualitative and quantitative 
data? 
b) When examining data that describe changes in students' 
representations of their thinking how can researchers define 
intervals over which change in underlying cognitive does and does 
not occur? 
c) What is an appropriate sampling rate for a microgenetic study of 
learning? 
d) How is it possible to manage the high variability that may occur in 
data sampled at a high frequency? 
e) What kinds of sequences of probes are appropriate within the 
microgenetic approach? 
 
The microgenetic approach is well established for the study of strategy 
acquisition, that is learners’ development of potentially conscious and controllable 
activities that achieve cognitive purposes (Pressley, Forrest-Pressley, Elliott-Faust, & 
Miller, 1985). For example, a strategy when approaching tasks that require the 
addition of two relatively small numbers is to begin at the lower number and count up 
the number of integers that matches the larger number. However, the use of the 
microgenetic method to study the kind of conceptual learning that is often the focus in 
science education, is less well established and requires alternative approaches 
(Parnafes & diSessa, 2013, p. 15). This review leads to a series of recommendation 
for researchers applying the microgenetic approach to learning in science education. 
The next section examines the definition of the microgenetic approach and examines 
what criteria may be appropriate for the application of the term in science education. 
The microgenetic method 
 
The microgenetic method has been described as ‘an observation of change 
whilst it occurs’ (Kuhn, 1995, p. 133) which allows researchers to investigate not only 
students’ knowledge, but the processes of change. The microgenetic approach has 
been defined by three characteristics: 
 
(a) Observations span the entire period from the beginning of the change to the 
time at which it reaches a relatively stable state.  
(b) The density of observations is high relative to the rate of change of the 
phenomenon. 
(c) Observed behaviour is subjected to intensive trial-by-trial analysis, with 
the goal of inferring the processes that give rise to both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of change. (Siegler & Crowley, 1991, p. 606)  
 
However, in practice, the categorisation of studies as microgenetic is 
‘somewhat subjective’ (Siegler, 2006, p. 479). A range of different types of study fit 
the approach: Miller and Coyle (1999, p. 210) argue that both a single thirty-minute 
session, containing multiple probes, and multiple sessions, spanning several months, 
may be considered microgenetic. To give a sense of the microgenetic approach, there 
follows a brief description of two contrasting studies in science education that are 
described by the authors as microgenetic. 
 
Garcia-Mila and Andersen (2007) investigated how children and adults made 
notes whilst undertaking scientific enquiry. Whilst completing a ten-week programme 
of practical work, the participants kept notes in a journal and were interviewed, twice 
a week, to understand their approach to note-taking. This method, the authors argue, 
allowed them to ‘observe progress from repeated practice’ and so develop ‘a fine-
grained assessment of strategy use’ (Garcia-Mila & Andersen, 2007, p. 1040). Van 
Der Steen and colleagues (2014) conceptualised their study of one 4-year-old boy’s 
developing understanding of air pressure as both longitudinal and microgenetic (for a 
discussion of the relationship between these methods, see the section on sampling 
rate, below). The boy was allowed to interact with three different pieces of apparatus 
consisting of syringes filled with air, and questioned about their functioning, over 
three sessions spaced three months apart. The transcribed interviews were coded for 
the level of complexity of the boy’s answers, and graphs representing the second-by-
second fluctuation in inferred complexity in each of the three sessions were plotted. 
The authors claim this method allowed insight into both the short-scale variability and 
longer-term development of understanding of air pressure. These two examples 
illustrate how differing approaches may be utilised within a microgenetic framework 
and show that researchers may select different timescales for both observations made 
within sessions, and the schedule of data collection sessions.  
 
A number of approaches to sampling students’ understanding of science at 
multiple occasions over time have been described and should be distinguished from 
microgenetic research. Learning process studies are a type of research which develops 
representations of a sequence of conceptions of a particular topic over time 
(Niedderer, Budde, Givry, Psillos, & Tiberghien, 2007). A related type of studies, 
learning pathway studies, reports the development of a particular conception over 
time. For example, Petri and Niedderer (1998) described a sequence of four 
conceptions of the atom a student transitioned through over the course of 16 weeks of 
instruction. Alternatively, an approach in which a student was interviewed 23 times 
over the course of two years (Taber, 2001) was conceptualised as a case study of 
learning. Such approaches can develop models of how learners’ understandings 
transition through a series of different models, referred to variously as conceptual 
trajectories (Driver, Leach, Scott, & Wood-Robinson, 1994), learning progressions 
(Berland & McNeill, 2010) and developmental trajectories or corridors (Brown, 2004, 
pp. 84–85). However, none of these approaches specify a sampling rate; the unique 
feature of microgenetic research is that it requires more of the researcher than the 
collection of data at multiple points in time. The method entails the additional 
constraint that the rate of sampling is high compared to the rate of change of the 
phenomenon of interest (Siegler & Crowley, 1991, p. 606) in order to develop a 
representation of the processes of change, rather than snapshots of the progression 
(Flynn et al., 2006). Microgenetic studies may take many forms, but they must aim to 
collect data with a sufficiently high frequency to develop a construction of the 
trajectory of change. 
 
The term microgenetic has been used to describe a number of different 
phenomena or processes. Wertsch (1991, p. 33) observed that Vygotsky used 
microgenetic to refer to both the short-term unfolding of a single psychological act 
and also to a series of developmental changes that occur over the course of an 
experimental session. Here the term microgenetic is used to label a methodological 
approach for investigating learning, rather than for what is being investigated (so the 
potential ambiguity of the term in Vygotsky's work is not an issue). A separate 
distinction separates the usage of microgenetic to refer to psychological models of 
short timescale perceptual or cognitive processes, from its use as description of a 
methodological technique for deliberately intervening in learning which accelerates 
the course of a developmental sequence in a clinical setting (Rosenthal, 2004, p. 221). 
For example, the process of learning the skill of tying shoelaces, which may take 
several weeks in typical development, might be ‘miniaturised’ into sessions over a 
few days of intensive trials. For Catán (1986, p. 260), such acceleration remains a 
defining feature of microgenetic research; however, we will argue below (see section 
d, the noisiness and stability of data) that it is not a necessary component for studies 
in science education. To avoid such ambiguity, in this paper, microgenetic will be 
used to refer to an experimental technique, which meets, or attempts to meet, Siegler 
and Crowley’s (1991, p. 606) criteria. The next section examines some of the 
assumptions that may be made when data relating to cognition are constructed as a 
series of events over time. 
 
The assumption of a serial flow of data: some epistemological 
considerations 
 
Before proceeding, we wish to briefly outline a key assumption that informs 
the present review. We assume that this area of research needs to distinguish between 
the thinking a person is experiencing at some particular time (and which may be 
directly represented in their responses in research interviews for example) and the 
available conceptual resources that support that thinking (Taber, 2013). That is, we 
consider that explicit thinking (something that is of limited focus and in constant flux) 
is resourced by something more extensive, and - by comparison - relatively stable. 
This is what has been called cognitive structure (White, 1985), and might be related to 
the notion of the contents of long-term memory. Components or aspects of that 
underlying structure are accessed (‘brought to mind’) or activated during reflective 
thinking, and sometimes there may be multiple alternative potential resources that 
could be accessed to think about a particular issue, problem or question. In these cases 
it is quite possible only one of the viable alternatives will be cued on any particular 
occasion. 
 
We use the term conceptual change to refer to some substantive change (e.g., 
in contents and/or structuring) in this underlying substrate of mental resources. Even a 
difference in response to precisely the same stimulus question will not necessarily 
imply conceptual change, as the internal mental context in which particular resources 
are activated or not may depend upon many factors outside the control and knowledge 
of a researcher. Research into conceptual change is therefore complicated because a 
change in what a person is thinking (which is what a researcher can hope to directly 
infer by interpreting data elicited at any one time) from one time to another, may, or 
may not, reflect a substantive change in the underlying cognitive structure (which is 
only partially and less directly reflected in research data). 
 
Data used in science education research to explore cognition are constructed 
representations, and imperfectly reflect the nature of cognition (Taber, 2013). For 
example, though cognition may be parallel (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), many 
forms of data have an apparent sequential nature, for example the utterances in 
interviews and even concept maps are produced as, and might be read as, serial chains 
of concepts interlinked among themselves. The serial nature of data can be seen as 
arising from processes occurring at three levels, shown in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: The channelling of cognition into serial-in-time reports 
 
Cognition is complex (O’Brien & Opie, 1998, p. 13): processing may be 
parallel (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), involve tacit elements (Brock, 2015; 
diSessa, 2000; Taber, 2014) and the conscious experience of the order of cognitive 
processes over short timescales may be misleading (Dennett, 1991, pp. 168–169). The 
stream of consciousness experienced in the lifeworld is more than a single stream of 
information (Blackmore, 2002): Dennett (1991, pp. 253–254) argues conscious 
experience does not consist of a unitary flow of data, rather different systems create 
multiple drafts of information from stimuli, which are processed by different regions 
of the brain in quick succession. Consciousness imposes a sense of seriality onto the 
parallel nature of cognition (Baars & Franklin, 2003, p. 167), as illustrated in the left 
hand section of figure 1. 
 
In addition to psychological ordering, research instruments cause a further 
layer of sequencing (right hand side of figure 1) in the sense that the particular stimuli 
presented, and the order and form in which they are posed, act as cues for what a 
respondent 'brings to mind'. However, what a respondent ‘brings to mind’, which 
knowledge representations are activated, and in what order, is also in part determined 
by an internal mental context (put simply, what they have been recently thinking 
about). Probes of consciousness at different times will then produce different 
narratives: cognition at a given time is partly (but not wholly) dependent on the nature 
of the stimuli encountered (Dennett, 1991, pp. 135–136). This presents a 
methodological difficulty: it is assumed a learner may possess simultaneously existing 
understandings (Mortimer, 1995), but reports of their existence will be sequential.  
In the final stage of ordering, a researcher may divide the data into sections 
representing meanings, often at the level of utterances. A number of such units of 
meaning, for example a subsection of an interview related to a particular probe or an 
entire interview, may be considered to represent a single moment in time in the 
development of a student’s thinking, a static interval in the sequence of data. We 
define a static interval as a section of data over which it is assumed change is not 
taking place. In some studies researchers have (explicitly or implicitly) assumed a 
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single interview, involving multiple probes, can be considered as a single static 
interval (e.g. Taber, 2008b), whilst others (e.g. Parnafes & diSessa, 2013) have 
chosen to define the utterances related to a series of probes within a single interview 
as separate static intervals and sought to observe changes between them (a detailed 
discussion of these differing constructions of change occurs below). In practice, the 
nature of the human cognitive system is such that each activation or 'recall' of a stored 
representation in memory is intrinsically also a modification of that representation 
(Alberini, 2011; Nader, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2000; Taber, 2013), so although it is 
methodologically necessary to make a judgement about what counts as a static 
interval in a particular study prior to analysis, the processes that underpin conceptual 
change are active during any period of data collection that requires a participant to 
engage in relevant cognition.	The three levels of temporal ordering are accessible and 
controllable by the researcher to varying degrees (see table 1).  
Level Description  
Student’s cognitive 
processing 
Cognition is perceived as a series of mental states, but may 
have involved parallel processing. There is no direct access 
to the processes at this level.	 
Student’s 
metacognitive 
processing 
In response to probes, the student will make explicit and 
tacit decisions about the ordering of ideas. A student’s 
metacognitive comments may allow the researcher to 
construct some understanding of this processing. For 
example, a student may be able to explain consciously 
available aspects of their choice of a particular conception 
from multiple alternatives they possess. 
Researcher’s 
choice of probes 
and interpretations 
of student’s 
conceptions 
The researcher makes reasoned decisions regarding the 
nature and sequencing of probes and the division of data, 
which influence the constructed sequence of the 
representation of the student’s cognition. 
Table 1: Different levels of temporal ordering 
 
In this paper, we will focus on the third level of temporal ordering, which is 
explicitly controlled by the researcher. On this level, the term conception refers to a 
researcher’s construction of a student’s personal expressed understanding at a given 
time and concept refers to formal meanings in public knowledge (Gilbert & Watts, 
1983, p. 69; Taber, 2013, p. 283). The seriality of reports of cognition has received 
little attention, perhaps because the notion becomes increasingly significant when data 
is sampled at relatively high frequencies, as occurs in the microgenetic method, and 
so seriality has not tended to be a concern in studies that have explored cognition at 
one point in time, or longitudinally with a few temporally well-separated 
measurement points. In order to examine the ideas raised in this section in the context 
of science education, the following section examines those studies in science 
education that have claimed to make use of the microgenetic method. 
The microgenetic method in science education 
 
In creating a catalogue of microgenetic studies in science education (table 2) 
the following criteria were used: 
 
• Studies that self-define as microgenetic were included, regardless of the absolute 
value of the frequency of observations. Some studies that are defined as longitudinal 
may have relatively short intervals between observations (e.g. Pearsall, Skipper and 
Mintzes (1997) used a spacing of four weeks between observations): such studies 
have not been included where their authors do not describe them as microgenetic. A 
characteristic of microgenetic research is a claim for a high density of observations 
relative to the rate of change of the phenomenon being investigated, rather than an 
absolute claim of high-density sampling. This study aims to examine different authors 
conceptualisations of microgenetic research in science education and therefore the 
principal criterion for inclusion is an assertion that the research was carried out using 
the approach, rather than a specific frequency of sampling. 
• The selection strategy proposed by Cheng and Wan (2015) was used to find articles. 
Nine science education journals with high impact factors (The Journal of Research in 
Science Teaching, Science Education, Chemistry Education Research and Practice, 
The International Journal of Science Education, Research in Science Education, 
Science & Education, The International Journal of Science and Mathematics 
Education, The Journal of Science Education and Technology and Research in 
Science & Technological Education) were searched for the key-word “microgenetic.” 
Studies that claimed to make use of data collection methods based on microgenetic 
principles were included in the analysis. Cheng and Wan (2015) recommend that 
studies referred to in the initial set of papers are then examined to discover additional 
publications. This step was undertaken and several microgenetic studies in the context 
of science education, but not published in journals primarily focused on science 
education, were included in the sample. For example, Parnafes and diSessa’s (2013) 
research is a microgenetic study of the development of understanding of simple 
harmonic motion, but appeared in the journal Human Development. These studies are 
included as they met our selection criteria for the present review. We also hope that 
by including such studies they might be brought to the attention of colleagues in 
science education who would find them relevant but do not normally read the journals 
in which they were published.   
 
• Only studies related to science education in school or university contexts were 
included. For example, the context of a research laboratory in a study by Roth (2014) 
was not deemed relevant to this catalogue. 
 
• Apart from one PhD thesis (Chinn (1997)) that has not been published elsewhere, 
the catalogue of articles consists of peer-reviewed studies.
Table 2: Microgenetic studies in science education. Where details are unclear in the original study, this is indicated in the table. In cases where 
authors have described change as occurring over multiple tasks in one session (E.g. Opfer & Siegler, 2004), those tasks are defined as separate 
observations. The papers are listed by year of publication. 
 
Author(s) Number and 
age of 
Participants 
Phenomenon 
being studied 
and context 
Length of 
Study 
Number of 
observations 
Spacing of observations Length of 
individual 
observations 
Type of observation 
Kuhn & Phelps, 
1982 
15 students aged 
9-11 years old 
Problem solving 
in chemistry  
12 weeks 
(including 1 
week of 
vacation) 
11 1 week Unclear Questions based on interactions 
with practical equipment 
15 students aged 
9-11 years old 
Problem solving 
in chemistry  
14 weeks Up to 13 
sessions but 
participants 
left study after 
8 sessions if 
stability in 
strategy use 
achieved 
1 week Unclear Questions based on interactions 
with practical equipment 
Kuhn & 
O’Loughlin, 
1988 (Study 5) 
20 students aged 
8-12 years old 
Evaluating 
scientific 
evidence  
9 weeks 9 sessions 1 session per week 30-45 minutes Task involving evaluating evidence 
related to different types of balls, 
participants interviewed whilst 
completing task 
Kuhn, Schauble, 
& Garcia-Mila, 
1992 
12, 10-year old, 
fourth graders 
Theory and 
strategy revision 
about factors 
affecting the 
speed of cars 
and boats 
9 weeks 19 2 sessions in a week 20-30 minutes 
for car domain 
 
30-45 minutes 
for boat 
domain 
Problem solving sessions with 
practical equipment or computer 
simulation, interview sessions 
20 fifth-sixth 
graders 
Scientific 
reasoning about 
factors affecting 
the speed of cars 
and balls  
7 weeks 7 1 week 30 minutes Problem solving sessions with 
practical equipment or computer 
simulation, interview sessions 
Nuthall & Alton-
Lee, 1993 
(Study 1) 
3 students aged 
9-10 years old 
Learning about 
conservation, 
erosion and 
endangered 
species 
31 days Transcript 
divided into 
15 second 
long sections- 
unclear as to 
total number 
or spacing 
Transcript divided into 
15 second long sections- 
unclear as to total 
number or spacing 
Total of 129 
hours- unclear 
as to 
individual 
duration or 
spacing 
Continuous observation, video and 
audio recorded. Pre-test then post-
test and interviews after 
observations, and again 12-months 
after observation 
Johnson & 
Mervis, 1994 
16 five-year-old 
students 
Knowledge of 
shorebirds 
17 days 5 Four, one hour long 
sessions at intervals of 3-
5 days, 30 minute 
session within 2 days of 
fourth session 
Four, one hour 
sessions and 
one 30 minute 
session 
Tests of knowledge, triad task, 
general sorting task 
1 four-year-old 
boy 
Knowledge of 
shorebirds 
17 days 5 Four, one hour long 
sessions at intervals of 3-
5 days, one 30 minute 
session within 2 days of 
fourth session 
Four, one hour 
sessions and 
one 30 minute 
session 
Tests of knowledge, triad task, 
general sorting task 
Zohar, 1995 25 students at 
community 
college, mean 
age, 32 years 
Reasoning about 
variables 
10 weeks 20 Two sessions per week 30 minutes Five tasks on reasoning about 
variables, recordings of sessions 
Magnusson, 
1996 
8 fourth grade 
students 
Learning about 
sound 
3 months Unclear Weekly or biweekly 10 minutes Classroom activities videotaped and 
observed, student presentations 
videotaped, individual interviews 
and post intervention interviews 
Schauble, 1996 10 fifth and 
sixth graders 
10 unrelated 
adults 
Scientific 
reasoning about 
objects 
immersed in 
fluids and 
placed on 
springs 
2 weeks 6 Six sessions over 2 
weeks 
40 minutes Interviews at start and end of 
sessions, data record cards from 
practical sessions 
Chinn, 1997 61 sixth and 
seventh grade 
students 
Knowledge 
about molecules 
and chemical 
6.5 weeks 13 Two sessions per week 60-80 minutes Guided interviews with instructors 
involving engagement with 
experiments and texts. Think aloud 
reactions protocols produced 
Duit, Roth, 
Komorek, & 
Withers, 1998 
25 tenth grade 
students 
Conceptual 
change related 
to chaotic 
systems 
2 weeks 4 Unclear 90 minutes Pre-test, students interactions with 
experiments and simulations 
videotaped 
Hogan, 1999 12 eighth grade 
students 
Personal 
frameworks 
related to the 
nature of matter 
12 weeks Unclear Classes recorded two or 
three times a week 
Unclear Interviews before and mid way 
through course. Classes video and 
audio taped 
Nuthall, 1999 
(Study 6) 
5 students 
(average age 
11.8 years) 
Knowledge of 
the habitat of 
Antarctica 
 
6 days Unclear- 13.4 
hours of 
observation 
over 6 days 
Unclear- 13.4 hours of 
observation over 6 days 
Unclear- 13.4 
hours of 
observation 
over 6 days 
Written multiple choice pre- and 
post-tests, classroom observation 
with video-cameras, record of 
students writing in class, records of 
students homework, interviews at 
end of observations and long-term 
(12-month later) post-test and 
interview 
Chinn, 
O’Donnell, & 
Jinks, 2000 
 
105 fifth grade 
students 
Argument 
structure in 
group work on 
electrical 
circuits  
2 sessions 
over 1 day 
2 2 sessions over 1 day 50-60 minutes Students carried out experiments, 
wrote conclusions and evaluated 
pre-written conclusions. 
Discussions were recorded and 
transcribed 
Izsak, 2000 24 eighth-grade 
students 
(students 
worked in pairs) 
Knowledge 
structures 
related to the 
winch 
3-4 weeks 3-4 
 
1 week 60 minutes Problem solving, with physical 
apparatus, videotaped 
Azmitia & 
Crowley, 2001 
24 
undergraduates  
Scientific 
thinking in the 
context of 
building towers 
to withstand 
earthquakes 
1 week 6 sessions (4 
individual, 2 
collaborative. 
Individual 
sessions 
preceded and 
followed 
collaborative 
sessions) 
1 week 15 minutes Questioning, and collaborative 
sessions videotaped 
Roth & Welzel, 
2001 
8 tenth grade 
students 
Use of gestures 
and scientific 
discourse in the 
context of 
electrostatics 
10 weeks 20 2 per week 45 minutes Videotaped lessons, pre- and post- 
interviews, and written tests in week 
4, 10 and 15 
Wiser & Amin, 
2001 
4 students just 
finished eighth 
grade 
Conceptual 
change in the 
domain of 
thermal physics 
5 weeks  Unclear Several mornings a week  
 
2 hours Teaching-learning sessions 
audiotaped. Individual interviews 
were conducted before, during, 
immediately after, and 6 months 
after the teaching sessions  
Gelman, Romo, 
& Francis, 2002 
22 ninth grade, 
ESL students 
Conceptual and 
language 
learning across 
various science 
topics studied by 
ESL students 
1 academic 
term 
10 units Unclear Unclear Students’ writing and concept maps 
in notebooks based on experimental 
sessions 
Eichler, Del 
Pino, & 
Fagundes, 2004 
8 students aged 
14-17 years old 
Conceptual 
development 
linked to air 
pollution 
As many 
sessions as 
required to 
complete 
the task 
Unclear Unclear 45 minutes Logfiles from engagement with 
computer simulation, texts written 
whilst using simulation, audio 
transcripts recorded during use of 
simulation. 
Opfer & Siegler, 
2004 
80 kindergarten 
students aged 5-
6 years old 
Conceptual 
change in the 
categorisation of 
living things 
1 session 3 tasks in 1 
session 
3 tasks in 1 session Unclear Pre-test, post-test categorisation 
tasks, questioning 
Veal, 2004 2 prospective 
secondary 
chemistry 
teachers 
Pedagogic 
content 
knowledge 
1 year Unclear Observations, daily for 1 
hour, 5 days a week for 
first semester. Vignettes 
shown to participants 
once every 3 weeks 
Unclear Pre, during and post interviews 
Observations of teacher, teachers’ 
journals and responses to vignettes  
Feldon & 
Gilmore, 2006 
154 students (52 
members of 
sixth grade 
science class, 42 
Scientific 
problem solving 
in the context of 
infectious 
Unclear and 
user 
dependent 
2 Sessions 
(possible 
multiple uses 
of simulations 
Unclear and user 
dependent 
Unclear and 
user 
dependent 
Data from interaction with 
computer simulations 
free-choice users 
of online site) 
diseases by participants 
in each 
session) 
Pata & Sarapuu, 
2006 
53 Secondary 
students aged 
15-17 years old 
Reasoning 
processes in the 
context of 
genetics 
Unclear Use of 
collaborative 
virtual 
workshop 
divided into 4 
phases 
Unclear Unclear Pre-essay, post-essay, discussion 
whilst using collaborative virtual 
workshop 
Garcia‐Mila & 
Andersen, 2007 
15 fourth grade 
students and 16 
community 
college students 
aged 22-47 
years old. 
Developmental 
change during 
note taking in 
scientific 
inquiry 
10 weeks 20 2 in a week 30-45 minutes Students carried out various 
practical, computer and paper-based 
tasks. Students’ notes in notebooks 
collected 
Soong, 2008 37 students aged 
15-16 years old 
Computer 
mediated 
collaborative 
physics problem 
solving  
9 weeks 4 Weeks 1, 2 and 7, 8 1.5 hours Computer based problem solving. 
Data taken from students’ chat logs 
Kuhn, 2010 40 sixth grade 
students 
Scientific 
argumentation 
skills 
7-8 weeks 13 2 in a week over 7-8 
week period 
Unclear Students engaged in argumentation 
via a computer-based system, 
reflection sheets 
Parnafes & 
diSessa, 2013; 
Parnafes, 2007, 
2010 
(Note: Data 
from one study 
analysed in three 
papers) 
16 students aged 
14-18 years old. 
Students worked 
in pairs 
Learning, and 
the development 
of 
epistemological 
complexity 
related to simple 
harmonic 
motion 
1 session, 
1.5 hours 
long 
3 sections 
within 1 
session 
First two sections last 
25-40 minutes. Final 
section 10-15 minutes 
First two 
sections last 
25-40 
minutes. Final 
session 10-15 
minutes 
Students videotaped interacting 
with physical oscillators, then with 
computer simulations and finally a 
discussion with researchers about 
the main conceptual issues 
Garcia-Mila, 
Andersen, & 
Rojo, 2011 
34 sixth graders 
aged 11-13 
years old 
Laboratory 
record keeping 
in the context of 
plant growth 
4 weeks 7 Twice a week 30-45 minutes Tests of content knowledge in first 
and final sessions, questioning 
during sessions, students’ notes 
Srivastava & 
Ramadas, 2013 
5 students, aged 
17-19 years old, 
in the 1st year of 
a bachelor 
degree course 
Understanding 
of the 3D nature 
of DNA 
9 days 6 Unclear 1-1.5 hours A clinical interview-cum-teaching 
sequence was videotaped. The 
students drew diagrams and 
engaged with models. 
diSessa, 2014 
 
 
1 grade 8-10 
student 
Construction of 
causal schemes 
related to 
cooling curves 
2 sessions Change within 
one session 
and into start 
of next  
2 days 3 hours Students carried out experiments, 
produced a computer model and 
were videotaped 
Unclear but 
multiple, grade 
8-10 students 
Construction of 
causal schemes 
related to 
cooling curves 
1 session Change within 
1 session 
Change within session 22 minutes Students were videotaped in 
discussions around drawing a graph 
following a practical experiment 
Van Der Steen, 
Steenbeek, Van 
Dijk, & Van 
Geert, 2014 
 
1 boy aged 4-
years old 
Understanding 
of air pressure 
6 months 3 3 Months (Change also 
assessed within sessions) 
15 minutes  Practical tasks involving syringes 
were videotaped 
Berland & 
Crucet, 2016 
2 fifth/sixth 
grade students 
Epistemological 
sophistication 
related to plate 
tectonics 
1 session of 
90 minutes 
Change within 
session 
1 session Variable Students’ model construction was 
videotaped, post interview 
Ha, Lee, Lim, & 
Yang, 2016 
9 sixth grade 
students 
Understanding 
of the particle 
model 
6 days 6 sessions 1 day Unclear Students were videotaped in semi-
structured interviews creating 
models 
Haglund, 
Jeppsson, & 
Schönborn, 2016 
46 students aged 
9-11 years old 
(Analysis is of 
subgroup of 
students) 
Understanding 
of heat 
9 minutes 
35 seconds 
4 Session divided into 4 
episodes- length unclear 
Unclear Practical tasks and class 
presentations and demonstrations 
videotaped 
The next sections address five issues related to microgenetic studies arising from an 
examination of the studies in table 2: a) appropriate frameworks for microgenetic 
research; b) claims regarding change and the static interval; c) sampling rate and the 
rate of change of learning; d) noisiness and stability of data; and e) appropriate forms 
of repeated measures. 
a) Appropriate frameworks for microgenetic research: the case for small-
scale qualitative microgenetic research 
 
The papers listed above provide a context in which to examine how the 
microgenetic method has been understood in science education. One author who has 
commented on the use of the approach, Chinn (2006, pp. 443–444), made a case that 
certain kinds of small-scale, qualitative, repeated measures studies are not 
microgenetic for the following reasons:  
 
1) The sampling frequency in the studies is too coarse to detect change and/or 
data is not reported between the pre- and post-test. 
2) Data collected in the studies are not analysed on a moment-by-moment 
basis. 
3) Probes in the studies are not counterbalanced (a technique used to reduce 
practice and task effects by changing the order of the probes presented to 
individual participants (Gaito, 1961, p. 46)).  
4) The sample size in the studies is too small for statistical analysis. 
 
Whilst Chinn has identified some useful indicators for including studies in the 
microgenetic canon, we argue his indicators should not be considered as absolute 
criteria and a more nuanced evaluation is appropriate. The criticisms relating to 
sampling rate, moment-by-moment analysis and counterbalancing of tasks are not 
inherent issues of small-scale, qualitative studies and may equally be applied to some 
quantitative, microgenetic studies. These issues are considered further below, after a 
case is made for the value of the microgenetic approach in studies designed to collect 
qualitative data from small numbers of participants. The remainder of the paper 
addresses four themes that become relevant when small-scale, qualitative, 
microgenetic studies are carried out, including issues relating to Chinn’s first three 
criticisms. 
Parnafes and diSessa (2013) have argued that the microgenetic method fits 
well with a case study approach: it is expected that high-density sampling will lead to 
‘… a high degree of individual and contextual variation’ (Parnafes & diSessa, 2013, 
p. 7) and the case study approach is described as being sensitive to such idiosyncrasy 
(Yin, 1981, p. 59). Small numbers of participants are usual in microgenetic research, 
even single participant studies are not uncommon (Siegler, 2006, p. 472). Though 
small-scale studies have been criticised for their limited generalisibility (Feldon & 
Gilmore, 2006), Parnafes and diSessa (2013, p. 7) argue that microgenetic case 
studies may have stronger ecological validity and develop greater insights than strictly 
controlled, laboratory-based studies. A focus on individual variability means ‘…it 
makes little sense to average performance over individuals’ (Kelso, 1995, p. 161) and, 
rather than larger sample size, the high frequency of observation in microgenetic 
research, may ‘minimize measurement error’ (Lee & Karmiloff-Smith, 2005, p. 257).  
Siegler (2006) suggests researchers balance the number of participants against 
the number of sessions; if the number of participants is low then a high density of 
observations is required and vice-versa. For example, a study by Robinson and 
Mervis (1998) in which a single participant was observed for more than 300 sessions, 
epitomises Merriam’s (1995, p. 57) claim that in qualitative research the goal is ‘to 
understand the particular in depth, rather than finding out what is generally true of 
many.’ That is, the research tends to be idiographic rather than nomothetic in nature 
(Gilbert & Watts, 1983). Arguably, in designing microgenetic research, the number 
and frequency of observations of an individual should be planned according to the 
requirements of the method (i.e., sufficient to span likely changes, and frequent 
enough to document changes occurring, see below), and once this is established the 
numbers of participants may be considered based on the purposes of, and the 
resources available, for the study. 
The mean number of participants in the studies listed in table 2 is 25 and the 
mode is 15. The frequency distributions of participants in these studies are shown in 
figures 2 and 3. Note that Kuhn and Phelps (1982), Kuhn, Schauble, and Garcia-Mila 
(1992) and Johnson and Mervis (1994) consist of two discrete studies, involving 
different numbers of participants and those studies have been counted separately. 
Kuhn (2010) and one of the cases in diSessa (2014) could not be included in these 
graphs, as the number of participants is not stated. Note that figure 3 represents a fine-
grained division of those studies with fewer than 26 participants. 
 
0	5	
10	15	
20	25	
30	
1-25	 26-50	 51-75	 76-100	 101-125	 126-150	 151-175	
N
um
be
r	
of
	s
tu
di
es
	
Number	of	participants	
Figure	2:	Number	of	microgentic	studies	with	a	
range	of	participants	
 
 
 
 
The number of participants in microgenetic studies leads to some distinctions 
in analytical approach: in studies with high N (for example, Chinn et al., 2000; Feldon 
& Gilmore, 2006; Opfer & Siegler, 2004) analysis tends to be quantitative. In smaller 
scale studies, a greater variety of analysis types are found: largely qualitative analysis 
(Wiser & Amin, 2001), mainly quantitative approaches (Van Der Steen et al., 2014) 
or a mixture of both (Nuthall, 1999). Clearly, different approaches are appropriate for 
different kinds of investigation, depending upon the precise research questions posed 
in particular studies. Chinn’s (2006, p. 444) argument against qualitative microgenetic 
studies might be valid if statistical generalisability were the only goal of research. 
However, qualitative studies are typically not aiming for statistical generalisability but 
aim instead to provide in-depth detail about particular cases (Taber, 2000a). Provided 
researchers undertaking small-N, microgenetic studies follow the recommendations of 
qualitative methodologists to address issues of reliability and validity (see 
Conclusions, below), the emphasis in-depth studies place on the richness of individual 
experience may be an excellent fit for the microgenetic approach.  
b) The static interval in microgenetic research 
 
The microgenetic method’s focus on the processes of change requires 
researchers to describe the interval over which change is considered to occur. It is 
common in analysing qualitative data, such as transcripts of interviews, classroom 
dialogue, think aloud protocols and the like, for the analyst to divide up the transcript 
into what are perceived (by the analyst) as a sequence of somewhat distinct episodes 
in the data that can each be coded in their own terms and then considered as parts of a 
sequence (see figure 4). This fragmentation of the data set into more manageable 
sections is usually undertaken based on the analyst's interpretation of shifts in the 
narrative being constructed from the data. Often, the underlying assumption is that the 
sequence of episodes refers to one point in time in the sense of a particular stage in 
the ongoing history of a learner or group.	In microgenetic research, however, a 
researcher may assume that significant change may occur during data collection such 
that a transcript may be a record of several distinct phases in the development of the 
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phenomenon being explored. This raises a key issue about how data, perhaps a 
transcript with a long sequence of utterances alternating between an interviewer and 
participant (labelled as I and P in figure 4), can be fragmented during analysis in ways 
that acknowledge and provide insights into potential change.		
 
Figure 4: An illustration of the concept of static interval. The image displays a 
section of transcript. I and P refer to the interviewer’s and participant’s utterances 
respectively. 
 
In order to report change, researchers will describe a perceived difference 
between data collected at two or more different times. This approach assumes that 
change occurs in the interval between these two sections of data but, crucially, the 
sections of data themselves, the start and end points of the change, are assumed to be 
essentially static: change occurs between the sections rather than during the sections. 
These periods in which no change is assumed to occur are referred to here as static 
intervals (see figure 4). Siegler (1995, p. 226) draws an analogy between the rapid 
flow of images in a film and the high density of observations in microgenetic data. A 
static interval may be likened to an individual frame in a film in which the action 
appears paused but when played in a sequence, may display evidence of change. 
 
There follows a discussion of two papers, Parnafes and diSessa (2013) and 
Taber (2008b), to illustrate the concept of the static interval. Parnafes and diSessa 
(2013) investigated students’ understanding of simple harmonic motion. In the study, 
described in detail in Parnafes (2010), the students participated in an interview of an 
hour-and-a-half duration consisting of three sections: a) interaction with physical 
oscillators (25-40 mins); b) interaction with computer simulations (25-40 mins); and 
c) concluding discussions (10-15 mins). In their analysis, the authors report that a 
student reached two different conclusions about the concept of ‘fastness’ in the 
contexts of an oscillating pendulum and a rod (Parnafes & diSessa, 2013, p. 24). In 
the case of the pendulum, the student infers that velocity is related to the distance the 
pendulum travels (that is, when it has a larger amplitude, it is travelling faster); when 
studying the oscillations of a springy rod, the ‘fastness’ of the motion is linked to the 
frequency of tapping of the rod on the desk. 
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Parnafes and diSessa argue: 
 
This is a canonical case of lack of alignment; while Rachel 
believes she is determining the same kind of information in both 
situations, ‘fast or slow,’ she is actually determining two 
different kinds of information. (Parnafes & diSessa, 2013, p. 24) 
 
By contrast, it is reported that the introduction of friction to a computer 
simulation ‘… led to the discovery of an important new relationship’ (Parnafes & 
diSessa, 2013, p. 26). Two interpretations of sequential reports of two different 
understandings are presented: the first implies two different conceptualisations 
coexist, the second that a change has occurred. In the first case, the pendulum and the 
rod are seen as two contexts triggering different interpretations of ‘fastness’ (as in 
Mortimer’s (1995) conceptual profile model) with an implication that the probe 
triggers alternative understandings to be brought to mind rather than causing change. 
In the second case, in the context of the computer simulation, the presentation of one 
understanding of periodicity followed by another is seen as a ‘discovery’ rather than a 
shift between co-existing positions.  
 
 The aim of highlighting the difference in conceptualisation is not intended to 
criticise Parnafes and diSessa’s (2013) interpretations of the data, but rather to 
highlight that a shift in conceptualisation has occurred. In the case of the pendulum 
and the rod, the two different understandings are treated as though they occupy the 
same interval in time, that is, they are constructed as existing concurrently. In the case 
of the ‘discovery’ of a novel understanding of periodicity, a claim for the occurrence 
of change is made. The concept of a static interval, defined above as a section of data 
over which it is assumed change does not take place, may be a useful construct to 
distinguish these two cases. The two models of ‘fastness’ are considered to coexist 
within a single static interval whereas the shift in understanding of periodicity, by 
implication, implies a transition between two static intervals. A discussion of the 
difficulty of distinguishing conceptual change from the presence of multiple 
conceptions is outlined in the next section. 
 
Taber (2008b) presents a different division of time: he interviewed students to 
examine their application of knowledge of forces and energy to a variety of contexts, 
introduced sequentially: an apple hanging on a branch, the solar system, and a 
stretched spring, amongst others. In Taber’s (2008b) study, the intention was to 
explore thinking related to the same underlying scientific ideas in different contexts, 
and so the study was not intended to be microgenetic. However it is possible to 
conceptualise the work as a study of potential change: the student is presented with 
multiple, sequential tasks that, from a formal scientific perspective, access similar 
conceptual knowledge. 
 
Taber suggested that this kind of interview covering a wide range of topics 
offered potential to explore the complexity of a learner’s cognitive structure (the 
presence of manifold conceptions, the range of application of a principle from the 
students perspective, i.e. the extent to which a principle was applied in different 
contexts). He reported that: 
 
The findings suggest such approaches make it possible in principle 
to identify situations where a student does not demonstrate ‘target 
knowledge’ because it is not accessed in a particular context rather 
than there being a lack in the basic conceptual resources. Alice did 
understand the principle of electrical induction—but did not offer 
that as a basis for explaining the balloon ‘trick’. In that context, this 
possibility did not seem to come to mind as a basis for an 
explanation—she did not make the link. Such ‘failures to connect’ 
are potentially significant in science teaching and learning. (Taber 
2008b, p.1934, italics in original) 
 
The argument was that although the student interviewed, Alice, did not 
suggest that a balloon charged by fiction remained stuck on a wall due to induction, 
this was a failure of application (i.e. of making a connection, of bringing a principle 
that could be applied to mind) and not ignorance of the possibility of induction. This 
was inferred because later in the interview Alice explained van der Waals’ forces in 
terms of electrical induction. Another example offered in that study concerned the 
relationship between force and motion. Alice described orbital motion as occurring 
without net force, as she considered there were two forces (centripetal and 
centrifugal) which balanced. Alice described this balance of forces at two different 
points in the interview when asked about the planets orbiting the sun, and later when 
asked about the moon orbiting the earth. This data could have been interpreted to 
suggest that Alice did not understand that accelerated force required net force. Yet in 
the same interview, and indeed between the two points where she talked about orbital 
motion, Alice discussed the forces acting on a parachutist falling to earth, and 
described both accelerated motion under net force and terminal velocity where forces 
balanced. The conclusion drawn was that Alice did understand the relationship 
between force and acceleration, but did not apply this principle to explaining orbital 
motion (which she did not consider accelerated motion). 
 
It is known that research interviews have something of the structure of 
Socratic dialogue, and can act as learning contexts for students. It was possible that 
Alice’s understandings changed through the process of being asked about her ideas, 
and that her responses at different points in the interview could be seen as reflecting 
underlying cognitive structure that was evolving during the interview process. In that 
case, her responses to consecutive probes might be considered to exist in separate 
static intervals and change might be inferred between them. Indeed some degree of 
change is likely (just as we hope it will be during a science lesson). However, the 
assumption made in the study was that any such change was limited enough to allow 
the whole interview period to be accessing thinking resourced by cognitive structure 
that was stable enough to be considered to be essentially fixed over the period of data 
collection (approximately one hour). Taber’s (2008b) conceptualisation of the study 
can be understood as implying that the data exist within a single static interval and 
that change to cognitive structure during the interview was negligible. 
 
Taber (2008b) and Parnafes and diSessa (2013) used similar methods: a single 
interview including multiple, non-identical, probes of a student’s understanding. 
However, the authors characterise their data differently, in particular they make 
implicitly different assumptions about the division of reports of cognition over time. 
The interview is considered either as a single static interval, describing an unchanging 
cognitive structure applied in several contexts (as in Taber, 2008b), or the interview is 
interpreted as containing multiple static intervals, describing an evolving 
understanding (as in Parnafes and diSessa’s (2013) report of a discovery). Both of 
these interpretations are justifiable, however it is important that authors clearly define 
their assumptions related to the intervals over which change does and does not occur. 
A researcher’s choice of static interval will depend on the phenomenon being 
investigated. Some kinds of change, labelled development, are expected to happen in 
all normal subjects due to a process of maturation (for example the acquisition of 
spoken language). Learning is a different kind of change process, which is both highly 
contingent on opportunities to engage with specific natural phenomena and to 
experience cultural mediation (such as teaching) of canonical knowledge, and is also 
dependent upon how such experiences are understood in terms of existing cognitive 
structure. The investigation of these different phenomena requires different research 
approaches. Microgenetic studies of development tend to focus on behaviours or the 
use of strategies. For example, Adolph and colleagues (2008) examined infants’ 
motor development by recording instances of sitting, crawling, walking and other 
skills. Such phenomena have relatively clear starting and ending points, though there 
may still be ambiguity, for example, an infant may engage in a behaviour that 
combines elements of crawling and walking. In these cases, a relatively short duration 
static interval may be constructed, as the behaviours have a relatively short duration, 
and are relatively well defined, as the start and end points of change are relatively 
distinct. However the situation is more complicated if the investigation focuses on 
learning scientific concepts: as Parnafes and diSessa (2013, p. 15) state ‘[l]earning a 
concept simply cannot happen in a single try, as a new strategy usually appears.’ It is 
more challenging to define the start and end points of conceptual learning than for the 
process of the acquisition of a strategy, hence defining appropriate static intervals for 
the study of learning is challenging.   
The relationship between phenomenon and static interval may explain the 
focus in developmental psychology on strategy use (e.g. Philips & Tolmie, 2007; 
Siegler, 1995) and the historical focus in science education research on individual 
concepts rather than wider explorations of cognitive structure (Taber, 2009, p. 326). 
Strategies are generally relatively well defined and can be investigated with short 
static intervals, similarly it is usually expected that discrete conceptions can be 
elicited within a static interval by suitable probing. However, the extended length of 
time that would be required to probe a cognitive structure makes it difficult to 
maintain the assumption that change is not occurring over the observation period. 
Research interviews intended to explore conceptual understanding at one point in time 
always involve a compromise between thoroughness (requiring extended exploration 
across a range of contexts) and resolution (such that ideally conceptualisation does 
not change, despite a research interview clearly being a learning opportunity). There 
is an 'in principle' restriction when the researcher's aim is to detail an aspect of a 
person's cognitive structure at one moment, as both cognition and research are 
processes and so inevitably occur over time (Taber, 2013).  
c) Sampling rate and the rate of change of learning 
 
In order to construct a sufficiently high resolution representation of change, 
Siegler and Crowley’s (1991, p. 606) second criterion for microgenetic studies is that: 
‘The density of observations is high relative to the rate of change of the phenomenon’. 
This requirement might seem paradoxical as it appears that researchers are required to 
know the rate of change of a phenomenon before it has been investigated. In most 
cases however, researchers will be able to present evidence from previous research, 
pilot studies, or studies of related phenomena to make a reasonable estimate of the 
rate of change of the phenomenon they are investigating (an example discussion, in 
the context of conceptual change, is presented below). An appropriate choice of 
sampling rate is of crucial importance to research focused on change, including a 
number of significant areas in science education research: the nature of conceptual 
change (Özdemir & Clark, 2007, p. 356), alterations in conceptual profiles (Mortimer, 
1995) and the stability of students’ ideas (Taber, 1995). Microgenetic studies may be 
seen as a subset of longitudinal studies, in which ‘…two or more measures or 
observations are made at different times of the same individuals or entities’ (White & 
Arzi, 2005, p. 138). Wertsch (1985, p. 55) has described microgenetic studies as a 
form of ‘very short-term longitudinal study’ or more precisely, microgenetic studies 
can be thought of as longitudinal studies in which the rate of sampling is high 
compared to the rate of change of the phenomenon of interest.  
 
Most longitudinal studies are seen as developing ‘snapshots’ rather than the 
‘near continuous flow of information’ (Siegler, 1995, p. 226) seen in microgenetic 
methods: moment-by-moment analysis is seen as the ‘gold-standard’ of the 
microgenetic approach (Parnafes & diSessa, 2013, p. 7). When observing change, an 
overly low density of observations will result in a loss of detail in the data produced 
(Kuhn, 1995, p. 133). For example, Adolph and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that 
altering the choice of sampling rate of data on the development of motor skills, led to 
an apparent stage-like development not seen with higher rates of sampling. If 
researchers select an overly high sampling rate, the researchers and participants may 
undertake unnecessary sessions that produce limited evidence of change. To extend 
Siegler’s (1995, p. 226) analogy between the microgenetic method and cinematic 
film, if the shutter speed of a camera is too slow, moving objects will appear blurred 
in images, if the shutter speed is too high, the pictures may come out dark. The choice 
of sampling rate is a significant research decision as it will influence the 
representation of change developed in a piece of research. 
 
The Nyquist-Shannon theorem (Lüke, 1999) allows engineers to determine an 
appropriate rate at which to sample analogue signals (Shannon, 1949, p. 11) but no 
similar metric exists in the case of learning. In order to fulfil Siegler and Crowley’s 
(1991, p. 606) condition, researchers need to make and justify claims for the rate or 
rates of change of the phenomenon they are observing. The studies in table 2 
investigated a range of different phenomena, for example, understanding (Haglund et 
al., 2016; Van Der Steen et al., 2014) or learning (Magnusson, 1996; Nuthall & 
Alton-Lee, 1993) and a range of different sampling rates were used. In some cases 
change was observed over multiple measurements within a session (Opfer & Siegler, 
2004; Van Der Steen et al., 2014), in others, change was assessed using probes spaced 
several weeks apart (Soong, 2008). To focus on a particular example, much learning 
of interest in science education has been conceptualised as conceptual change. 
Conceptual change has modelled in a number of different ways, some of which 
include the possibility of change occurring at multiple rates (see table 3). A researcher 
interested in investigating conceptual change using the microgenetic approach should 
make a case that their choice of sampling rate is sufficiently high to adequately 
represent the change process they are studying. 
 
Author(s) Relatively gradual model Relatively rapid model 
Clement, 2008, p. 68 Accretionism Eurekaism 
West and Pines, 1985, p. 5 
 
Conceptual Development Conceptual Change 
Gilbert & Watts, 1983, pp. 
88–90 
Smooth change Stepped-change 
Catastrophic change 
Table 3: Models of conceptual change which suggest multiple rates of change occur 
 
Though a growing orthodoxy suggests conceptual change is largely gradual 
(Nussbaum, 1989, p. 538; Posner et al., 1982, p. 223; Vosniadou, 2008a, p. 12), there 
is evidence that significant shifts in conceptualisation may occur on shorter 
timescales, for example, Chi’s (1997, p. 230) sudden ontological recategorisations 
and Clement’s (2008, p. 99) model of insight. However, abrupt conceptual change 
‘does not appear to be the usual road to conceptual change’ (Vosniadou, 2008b, p. 
xvi) and insight is seen as ‘the exception rather than the rule’ (Fisher & Moody, 2002, 
p. 67). An insight, a moment of sudden awareness of novel relationships between 
concepts (Brock, 2015), that appears rapid may be the accumulation of gradual 
incremental steps in understanding (Nersessian, 1999, p. 14) or the result of a largely 
tacit incubation period (Smith, 1995, p. 242). It may be that conceptual change, and 
other cognitive processes, can occur at a variety of rates or at rates which vary over 
time. Researchers should consider, given a choice of sampling frequency, the types of 
variation that will be able to be inferred in, and those that will be excluded from, their 
data. 
 
Three studies in table 2 focused on conceptual change and used relatively high 
frequencies of observations: Duit, Roth, Komorek & Withers (1998) carried out four 
observations over two weeks; Wiser and Amin (2001) examined teaching sessions 
that occurred several mornings a week over five weeks; Opfer and Siegler (2004) 
analysed changes over multiple probes within a single session. In these cases there 
appears to an appropriate fit between the possibly short timescale variation of the 
phenomenon under investigation, conceptual change, and the frequency of 
observation. Defining the rate of change of phenomena such as understanding or 
learning is undoubtedly challenging. However, lacking from many microgenetic 
studies is a clear statement of the assumed rate or rates of change of the phenomenon 
being investigated. The relationship between the rate or rates of change of a 
phenomenon and the sampling frequency is a criterion for microgenetic research and 
researchers must make explicit their assumptions about these two rates in order to 
present an argument that their sampling is ‘high density’ (Siegler & Crowley, 1991, p. 
606). For example, in studies which investigate changes in understanding (E.g. 
Haglund et al., 2016; Van Der Steen et al., 2014), a claim for the use of the 
microgenetic approach might be supported by an explicit discussion of the rate of 
change of understanding in comparison to the sampling rate used in the study.  
d) Noisiness and stability of data collected with ‘high density’ sampling 
 
The third issue relating to data collected with the microgenetic method is a 
difficulty in distinguishing ‘signal’ from ‘noise’ (Silver, 2012). In the case of 
learning, this might mean discriminating ‘genuine systematic change’ in cognitive 
structure from transient fluctuations (Lee & Karmiloff-Smith, 2005, p. 257). Taber 
(2008a, p. 1028) argues researchers should ‘…distinguish between thinking that 
reflects stable ‘alternative conceptions’ from thinking that constructs a viable but 
labile response to which the learner has little commitment’ and so be able to 
discriminate ‘significant progression’ from ‘mental flotsam and jetsam’ (Taber, 1995, 
p. 5). This is not an easy distinction to make, as learning is increasingly seen as a 
‘messy’ process (Taber, 2013) involving the complex interaction of an array of 
structures (Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993, p. 148). The distinction between 
‘signal’ and ‘noise’ is especially acute in microgenetic research as the high frequency 
of sampling is reported as uncovering ‘untidy’ change (Flynn et al., 2007, p. 4). 
 
Though stable cognitive elements are often the focus in studies of learning 
(Petri & Niedderer, 1998, p. 1075; Taber, 1995), transient processes may none-the-
less be significant (Siegler, 2006, p. 488). If conceptual change resembles gradual 
accretion, with few moments of significant advance (Vosniadou, 2008a, p. 12), then it 
is the accumulation of the myriad  ‘false starts’ and ‘relapses to intuitive conceptions’ 
(Lappi, 2013, p. 2) that constitute learning. For strategy use at least, it is expected that 
periods of acquisition will be characterised by variability (Adolph et al., 2008, p. 2; 
Siegler & Chen, 1998, p. 278). As in the case of Penzias and Wilson’s discovery of 
the cosmic microwave background radiation, the ‘excess noise’ may turn out to be the 
signal (Partridge, 2007, pp. 46–48). Research is insufficiently advanced to determine 
whether transient conceptual elements have a significant role in longer-term learning 
and, therefore, they should not be excluded during analysis. An understanding that 
appears ad hoc or short-lived within a particular set of data, may, if observations were 
continued over an extended period, develop into a stable conceptual entity. In the 
absence of sufficient data researchers should be cautious in discounting the 
significance of apparently short-lived elements.	 
An additional difficulty is that a student may posses multiple co-existing 
understandings that are stable and selectively activated in response to particular 
contextual cues (Harrison & Treagust, 2000; Mortimer, 1995; Taber, 2000b). When 
sampling occurs at high densities, it becomes difficult to determine if a report of 
several different consecutive conceptions is evidence of multiple conceptions reported 
serially or conceptual change. 
  
Several studies report descriptions of change within a single session (Berland 
& Crucet, 2016; Opfer & Siegler, 2004; Parnafes & diSessa, 2013; Van Der Steen et 
al., 2014). Such descriptions of short timescale change are valuable, but it is important 
that researchers highlight that any claims to stability of change are only valid over the 
timescale of the probes. Kuhn and Phelps (1982, p. 39) report repeatedly observing 
students who appeared to ‘solve’ a problem in one session, but when presented with 
the same problem in the next session, failed to reapply their insight. It seems 
therefore, that both a high density of observation, to capture short timescale changes 
in conceptualisations, and an extended period of observation ‘so that shifts in the 
landscape of cognitive structure may be detected’ (Taber, 2001, p735) is required to 
develop a full representation of conceptual change. This approach is seen in Van Der 
Steen and colleagues (2014) study which reports change within three sessions that 
occur over a period of six months: both rapid changes in understanding and long-term 
stabilities in conceptualisation may be examined. This strategy can be conceptualised 
as a hybrid approach consisting of a longitudinal series of three periods of 
microgenetic sampling. Data collection schemes, which allow for variations that 
occur across a range of timescales may be useful for developing more nuanced 
models of change. 
 
Tracking change over extended periods of time can be onerous for the 
researcher and participants; one approach to capturing long-term change is to 
‘accelerate’ or ‘miniaturize’ (Catán, 1986, p. 260) learning into shorter than normal 
timescales. Both Catán (1986, p. 260) and Kuhn (1995, p. 137) argue that 
microgenetic studies should include an element of ‘acceleration’. For example, Kuhn, 
Schuable and Garcia-Mila (1992, p. 286) claim their exposure of ten year-old students 
to twice weekly 30-45 minute scientific reasoning problems over nine weeks, is an 
‘acceleration’ of the normal acquisition of these skills (for a different approach to 
acceleration, see Shayer and Adey, 1993). Though this approach has been used in 
some microgenetic studies, it is not clear if ‘accelerated’ learning resembles learning 
on longer timescales (Miller & Coyle, 1999, pp. 212–213). Siegler & Crowley’s 
(1991, p. 606) criteria do not require ‘acceleration,’ nonetheless any form of 
intervention is potentially an alteration of the ‘natural’ learning process. Though 
intentional ‘acceleration’ may sometimes be a useful tool for researchers in science 
education, it is not a necessary feature of microgenetic research. 
 
Studies which combine microgenetic and longitudinal approaches (E.g. Van 
Der Steen et al., 2014) allow for the description of both short timescale variability and 
the discussion of longer timescale stabilities. An extended period of sampling, across 
a range of contexts, may assist in distinguishing the presence of multiple conceptions 
from conceptual change. An alteration in the frequency with which a particular 
concept is applied in a given context, when observed over a sufficient number of 
trials, may be taken as evidence of conceptual change. It has been reported that 
substantive shifts in conceptualisation may take weeks, months or years to occur 
(Shuell, 1990, p. 531) and so it is it difficult to define a duration of observation that 
would be necessary to support a definitive claim regarding the occurrence of 
conceptual change. The third of Siegler and Crowley’s (1991, p. 606) criteria for 
microgenetic studies requires that ‘the entire period’ of change is observed until the 
phenomenon ‘reaches a relatively stable state.’ It may be possible to make claims for 
stability when studying the acquisition of strategies, which may reach a stable state 
within days or weeks, but similar contentions are much more challenging to achieve 
with a complex and extended phenomenon such as conceptual learning. The notion of 
moving towards theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 61) may be more 
appropriate than a defined interval of observation for phenomena such as learning or 
conceptual change. The ideal form of investigation would include microgenetic 
sampling over an extended period of time to provide evidence of the diversity and 
stability of conceptual entities. 
e) The use of sequences of repeated measures  
 
In defining the conditions of microgenetic studies, Chinn (2006, p. 441) states 
a participant ‘…typically encounters similar tasks and measures repeatedly’ and 
implies studies that do not use counterbalanced tasks should not be considered 
microgenetic (Chinn, 2006, p. 451). Counterbalancing is a technique intended to 
reduce the effects caused by repeatedly encountering the same task, by changing the 
order in which the probes are presented to individual participants (Gaito, 1961, p. 46). 
This section considers the methodological choices researchers face when choosing the 
types of probes to use in microgenetic studies. Sequences of measures may be thought 
of as existing on a continuum of similarity (see figure 5), including sequences of 
identical probes and sequences of probes which are apparently different but 
investigate the same conceptual area (the extreme case of sequences of non-identical 
probes that investigate unrelated conceptual areas is not considered here as it seems 
an unlikely choice for a researcher). However, defining similarity is not 
straightforward and perceptions of relatedness may depend on expertise. Chi, 
Feltovich and Glaser (1981, p. 125) highlighted that experts and novices 
conceptualised the similarity of problems in different ways and observed that expert 
physicists’ judgements of similarity may be difficult for novices to understand. For 
example, to an expert, a problem concerning the motion of the mass on a spring and a 
problem about a block sliding down a slope, may be perceived as similar, because 
their solution methods share the same ‘deep structure’ of energy conservation (Chi et 
al., 1981, pp. 125–127). Measures that have differing surface features may be argued, 
at least to an expert, to be similar if they share some kind of underlying structure (see 
figure 5). Of the studies listed in table 2, 15 used sequences of identical repeated 
measures, 13 sequences of non-identical measures and nine a mix of the two 
approaches. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The continuum of similarity of sequences measures 
The relatively high frequency application of probes characteristic of the 
microgenetic approach may produce artefacts in the data (Lee & Karmiloff-Smith, 
2005, p. 250), for example, the frequent exposure to novel experiences may differ 
from typical learning experiences and so influence learning progressions (Miller & 
Coyle, 1999, p. 212). The nature of assessment affects may vary for sequences of 
measures found at different places on the continuum above (see figure 5). For 
example, Siegler and Crowley’s (1991) use of a sequence of relatively similar 
measures in an investigation of addition strategies was criticised by Pressley (1992, p. 
1240) who argued that microgenetic studies lead to a confounding of ‘…time of 
assessment with experimental effects associated with assessment’. At the other end of 
the continuum, where identical measures are not used (such as in Parnafes and 
diSessa's (2013) paper), it is impossible to separate effects due to context from 
changes over time. If the intention of a study is to produce a narrative of a particular 
learner’s developing understanding across different contexts, this effect is 
unavoidable and non-identical measures are a necessary choice. The data then, as in 
Sequence of identical measures
For example repeated use of a question
over a series of sessions
E.g. 
A car collides with a stationary lorry. Which
vehicle experiences a greater force?
A car collides with a stationary lorry. Which
vehicle experiences a greater force?
A car collides with a stationary lorry. Which
vehicle experiences a greater force?
Valid comparisons between measures are 
possible. No inferences about studentsʹ ability to 
transfer learning are possible and practice effects 
from repeated exposure to a probe may influence 
the data.
Sequence of non-identical measures
Probes access the same conceptual understanding
in different contexts over a series of sessions
E.g.
A car collides with a stationary lorry. Which
vehicle experiences a greater force?
A horse is pulling a cart at a steady speed. Compare the
size of the force of the horse on the cart with the force of
the cart on the horse. 
A satelile orbits the Earth. Compare the size of the gravitational 
forces on the two objects.
Claims about the ability to transfer learning may be made and
practice effects are reduced. Valid comparisons of learning between 
measures are more complicated as it may be difficult to distinguish
changes due to particular contexts from changes over time. 
the case-study approach (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 221), are inherently bound up with the 
nature and order of probes and the interaction with the researcher. The onus on a 
researcher using non-identical measures is not to counterbalance the tasks, but to 
provide a detailed description of each probe and the participants’ responses. The use 
of non-identical but isomorphic probes is similar to the kind of assessment that a 
student might routinely encounter in the classroom, and so it might be argued to have 
stronger analytical generalisability (Kvale, 1996; Taber, 2000a) than a small-scale 
study using identical measures. 
 
 The choice of sequences of measures will be partly informed by the 
phenomenon being studied. Studies of strategy acquisition might be expected to use 
highly similar repeated measures, for example, Siegler and Jenkins (1989) repeatedly 
set participants a task involving the addition of two integers. Contrastingly, studies of 
the transfer of strategies to novel situations, by definition, require the use of non-
identical measures (E.g. Chen & Klahr, 1999). Experts, at least in some domains, 
appear to have the ability to transfer learning to novel situations (Haskell, 2001, p. 4; 
Mayer, 2002). It might be argued that transfer, the ability to apply learning to novel 
domains (Singley & Anderson, 1989), is a key feature of successful learning as 
‘…learning …almost always generalizes beyond the item on which a new approach 
was generated’ (Siegler, 2006, p. 494). Therefore, it has been argued, a microgenetic 
study of learning should involve a variety of related, but non-identical tasks that share 
similar underlying structures (Kuhn, 1995, p. 136). 
Finally, though it might be assumed that greater similarity between measures 
reduces variability in responses over short timescales; this is not necessarily the case. 
Lasry and colleagues (2011) tested one hundred students using the force concept 
inventory (Hestenes, Wells, & Swackhamer, 1992) and retested them within a week, 
with no additional instruction. Though they found a high-degree of reliability between 
individual’s total scores, on examining individual questions, they discovered roughly 
a third of responses had changed from the first to second administration. Kuhn and 
Phelps (1982, p. 40) reported significant variability in participants’ strategy use even 
when encountering identical problems and argue this variability should be treated as 
‘an important subject of substantive investigation, rather than a methodological source 
of error.’  
 
In microgenetic studies in science education, the choice of different types of 
sequences of probes should be related to the aims of the research. For example, where 
researchers sought to understand changes in students’ behaviours in a particular 
context, for example in understanding a winch (Izsak, 2000) or building towers to 
within stand earthquakes (Azmitia & Crowley, 2001), identical measures are 
appropriate. In other cases, the researcher may seek to understand a student’s ability 
to apply ideas across a range of different contexts and so use a range of probes that 
share ‘deep structure.’ For example, Duit, Roth, Komorek, and Withers (1998) 
observed students interactions with a range of scenarios related to chaotic systems and 
diSessa (2014) examined students’ thinking about causality over a number of different 
scenarios related to temperature equilibration. In these cases, the use of non-identical 
probes allowed the researchers to understand how students’ transferred, or failed to 
transfer, learning to novel contexts. 
The continuum of similarity of measure presents a choice for the researcher; 
identical measures may be useful for investigating well-defined, sharply focused 
questions (Cook, 2002, p. 179) concerning phenomena that require a short static 
interval. However, more complex forms of learning are fundamentally applicable 
across a range of contexts, and controlling for context would be mistaken (Maxwell, 
2004, p. 6). An approach, which uses probes with overlapping ‘deep structures,’ will 
provide a broader understanding of change, but an onus is placed on the researcher to 
justify the claim that the probes access conceptual understanding related to the same 
scientific concept. 
Recommendations arising from a consideration of microgenetic studies in 
science education 
 
The analysis of papers using the microgenetic method in science education has 
led to the identification of a number of considerations relevant to researchers who 
examine change in phenomena using the approach. In many cases, our criticisms are 
not related to the particular methodological choices made by researchers, but rather 
that research reports do not always make clear the assumptions that guided their 
decisions. Therefore, a number of these recommendations suggest that authors should 
aim to be explicit about certain kinds of assumption that underlie the manner in which 
they have constructed descriptions of change. 
 
• Assumptions regarding the rate or rates of change of the phenomenon being 
studied and the sampling frequency might be explicitly discussed. 
Ideally, researchers should present evidence of meeting Siegler and Crowley’s (1991, 
p. 606) core criterion by providing an argument for an assumed rate or rates of change 
of the phenomenon being studied and show that the pattern of observations made can 
be expected to reveal such changes.  
 
• A discussion of the static interval and its relation to the phenomena being 
studied may be useful in supporting claims of change.  
Researchers can strengthen claims about change by clarifying their assumptions 
concerning both the sections of data that are assumed to represent unchanging 
processing, a static interval, and how claims to change are developed by the 
comparison of static intervals. To clarify their case, researchers might make explicit 
the nature of the object of study (a particular strategy, a single concept, a conceptual 
area) and make a case that the chosen static interval is appropriate for that 
phenomenon. The static interval may be defined as several sessions, a whole session, 
or a part of a session, however the researcher must convince the reader that the 
phenomenon being studied would not be expected to vary significantly over that 
period.  
 
• Analysis may be quantitative or qualitative but a defining feature of 
microgenetic research is a sense of moment-by-moment change. 
The microgenetic approach may be used effectively within research designs collecting 
and analysing either, or both, qualitative and quantitative data providing researchers 
clarify the assumptions that support their work and make claims that are consistent 
with those assumptions. Fine-grained representations of change in both the 
ideographic and nomothetic traditions will contribute to developing a richer model of 
change (Gilbert & Watts, 1983; Taber, 2009, p. 391). However, the character of 
microgenetic studies is to represent moment-by-moment change and researchers 
should strive to develop high-density representations of change over time rather than 
descriptions of change between a number of widely spaced data collection episodes 
which are characteristic of longitudinal research. 
 
• Researchers should consider their choice of length of observation period to suit 
the phenomenon they are studying. 
The extent of observations made is significant for distinguishing conceptual change 
from the presence of multiple conceptions and for assessing the stability of 
constructions. However, given that some processes of interest in science education, 
for example conceptual learning, occur over an extended period of time, Seigler and 
Crowley’s (1991, p. 606) requirement for observation to cover the entire period of 
change may not be practicable. Useful insights may be derived from more limited 
observations, as long as the observation period can be expected to reveal a sufficient 
extent of change to be theoretically important. For example, research suggests that 
during a two-year chemistry course a student may show significant shifts in the 
pattern of explanations offered about the nature of chemical bonding without 
completely abandoning their initial alternative conceptions (Taber, 2001). With some 
phenomena it may not be practicable to present evidence of a phenomenon having 
reached ‘a relatively stable state’ (Siegler & Crowley, 1991, p. 606), however a 
researcher should present an appropriately extended section of data to enable 
judgements to be made concerning the typicality and stability of change. 
• Researchers should consider the appropriateness of the chosen sequences of 
assessments for investigating the phenomenon of interest. 
Sequences of probes with higher or lower degrees of similarity are acceptable though 
each type influences the data in particular ways. Where probes have lower surface 
similarity, researchers need to offer an explicit case for how the range of probes used 
can be considered to offer alternative prompts for accessing the same underlying 
skills or cognitive resources. Chinn’s (2006, pp. 443–444) criticisms of small-scale 
microgenetic studies apply inappropriate expectations of generalisability and validity 
to small-N studies, so instead we argue for the importance of researchers justifying 
the appropriateness of different methods for the study of various phenomena. For 
example, counterbalanced tasks and identical measures may be used to investigate 
phenomena that can be studied in relatively short static intervals, for example, 
problem-solving strategies. However, phenomena such as conceptual learning are 
more challenging to study and are likely to require longer static intervals and more 
complex and non-identical sequences of measures to probe transfer across contexts. 
 
• The microgenetic method may be used in small-scale studies providing caveats 
regarding generalisability, validity and reliability are provided. 
Similar kinds of justifications to those commonly found in small-scale research 
projects are required in small-scale microgenetic projects. It would be appropriate for 
a small-scale study to make use of analytical generalisability rather than statistical 
generalisability (Taber, 2000a). A qualitative conception of validity (Creswell & 
Miller, 2000) will be appropriate for such work and may be supported by: a) the use 
of multiple methods (such as concept-maps or concept inventories) within the 
microgenetic framework (Shenton, 2004, p. 65); b) a clear statement of theoretical 
position and assumptions (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 127); and c) rich description of 
data (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007, p. 244). Reliability, in case study research, is 
conceptualised as reducing ‘errors and biases’ and may be supported by reporting 
details of the methods and data (Yin, 2009, p. 45). The argument in this paper, which 
makes a case for the acceptability and fruitfulness of small-scale, qualitative 
microgenetic studies in science education, is not intended to criticise the value of 
large-scale, quantitative microgenetic studies: the approaches should be seen as 
complementary. As Taber (2009, p. 351) has suggested, educational research might be 
envisaged as an iterative process with a ‘methodological pendulum’ oscillating 
between small-scale, in-depth studies and more generalisable approaches. 
 
It is hoped that these guidelines will be useful to researchers using the 
microgenetic method. The variability of data produced by the microgenetic method, 
should not be seen as a hindrance, but rather as a reflection of the inherently 
changeable nature of cognition (Smith & Thelen, 2003, p. 343). In a model in which 
learning is seen as ‘messy’ (Taber, 2013), researchers might find it useful to assume 
that: ‘the signal is the noise’ (Landauer, 1998, p. 658). A potentially fruitful direction 
for science education research is to engage with the untidy, fine-grained detail of 
conceptual-structure change. Despite the costs in terms of time and effort (Lee & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2005, p. 259), the microgenetic method is an appropriate tool for 
observing change but researchers who use the method need to be explicit about the 
assumptions they make in their work. It is hoped this paper will contribute to a 
conversation regarding the use of the microgenetic method in science education.  
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